Reading Group

The EXPRESS Reading Group meets most weeks during term time. Please get in touch if you would like more information.

In the first semester of 2020/21, we will be discussing work on metasemantics, probability and conditionals:

  • 2 Dec: Williamson, Suppose and Tell (joint with LoC project)
  • 12 Nov: Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge, Ch. 5
  • 4 Nov: Williamson, Suppose and Tell (joint with LoC project)
  • 29 Oct: Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge, Ch. 4
  • 22 Oct: Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge, Chs 1 and 2
  • 8 Oct: Lassiter and Goodman, ‘Adjectival vagueness in a Bayesian model of interpretation’
  • 1 Oct: Yalcin, ‘Probability operators’
  • 23 Sept: Williamson, Suppose and Tell (joint with LoC project)
  • 16 Sept: Williamson, Suppose and Tell (joint with LoC project)
  • 10 Sept: Tienfesee, ‘Metasemantics for the relaxed’
  • 3 Sept: Williamson, Ch. 4 of The Philosophy of Philosophy and Murzi and Steinberger, ‘Inferentialism’ (sec. 4) 

In the second semester of 2019/20, we discussed papers on speech acts and expressivism:

  • 2 Jul: Charlow, ‘Prospects for an expresssivist theory of meaning’
  • 18 Jun: Erikkson, ‘Expressivism, attitudinal complexity and two senses of disagreement in attitude’
  • 11 Jun: Bacon, ‘Vagueness at every order’
  • 4 Jun: MacFarlane, ‘Vagueness as indecision’ (with response by Williams)
  • 28 May: Carter, ‘A suppositional theory of conditionals’
  • 21 May: Goldstein, ‘A theory of conditional assertion’
  • 14 May: Harris, ‘We talk to people, not contexts’
  • 7 May: Cuneo, ‘Can expressivism have it all?’
  • 30 Apr: Simons and Zollman, ‘Natural conventions and indirect speech acts’
  • 23 Apr: Köhler, ‘Normative disagreeement: a functional account for inferentialists’
  • 16 Apr: Yalcin, ‘Expressivism by force’
  • 9 Apr: Carballo, ‘Negation, Expressivism, and intentionality’
  • 31 Mar: Chrisman, ‘Expressivism, inferentialism, and saving the debate’
  • 17 Mar: Drucker, ‘The attitudes we can have’
  • 3 Mar: Marques, ‘Retractions’
  • 11 Feb: Caponetto, ‘Undoing things with words’

In the fist semester of 2019/20, we discussed papers on expressivism:

  • 21 Jan: Leïla, WIP on adversative markers
  • 3 Dec: Gibbard, *Thinking How to Live*, Ch. 4 and 7
  • 19 Nov: Gibbard, *Thinking How to Live*, Ch. 3
  • 29 Oct: Beddor, ‘A solution to the many attitudes problem’
  • 15 Oct: Wodak, ‘Expressivism and varieties of normativity’
  • 1 Oct: Perez-Carballo and Santorio, ‘Communication for expressivists’)

In the 2nd semester of 2018/19, we discussed papers on negation and anti-exceptionalism about logic:

  • 6 Jun: Steinberger, ‘Logical pluralism and logical normativity’
  • 10 Apr: Hjortland, ‘Anti-exceptionalism about logic’
  • 3 Apr: Woods, ‘Logical partisanhood’
  • 13 Mar: Read, ‘Anti-exceptionalism about logic’
  • 27 Feb: Williamson, ‘Semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology’
  • 20 Feb: Berto, ‘A modality called negation’

In the 1st semester of 2018/19, we discussed papers on assertion and rejection:

  • 6 Dec: Weiner, ‘Must we know what we say?’
  • 29 Nov: Geach, ‘Assertion’
  • 15 Nov: Cappelen, ‘Against assertion’
  • 1 Nov: Rumfitt, ‘”Yes” and “no”‘
  • 17 Oct: Pagin, ‘Is assertion social?’
  • 3 Oct: Brandom, ‘Assertion’ 
  • 26 Sep: Maitra, ‘Assertion, norms and games’
  • 19 Sep: Williamson, ‘Knowing and asserting’
  • 5 Sep: MacFarlane, ‘What is assertion?’